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I. INTRODUCTION

The international law on foreign investment is commonly accepted as
one of the most controversial areas of international law.1 Not only does
international investment law lack clear rules on investment promotion
and protection, this area of the law has always generated opposing rules,
and implicates divergent interests in the process.2 In the face of unclear
rules, and against the backdrop of the need to protect foreign investment
through the internationalization of investment dispute settlement, 3 and
the position that this will facilitate investment flows to Third World
states, 4 the World Bank established the International Centre for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). 5 In the last quarter of the
20th century, investment arbitration garnered considerable international
attention, especially in relation to issues that implicate international and
local public interest, including environmental protection, labor and human
rights. While issues of human rights and environmental protection are
relevant the world over, a further issue of economic development arises
in the case of the Third World. The drafters of the ICSID Convention
did not contemplate, at least not explicitly, public interest issues related
to foreign investment that have become prominent lately. However, they
did consider ICSID's utility in facilitating the economic development of

1. M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 1 (2d ed.
2004) [hereinafter SORNARAJAH, INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT].
2.
For an instructive analysis of the intricacies of investment promotion and
protection in developing countries, see Jurgen Voss, The Protection and Promotion of
Foreign Direct Investment in Developing Countries: Interests, Interdependencies and
Intricacies,31 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 686 (1982).

3. See Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel, Settlement of Disputes between Parties from
Developing and IndustrialCountries, 15 ICSID REv.-FILJ 275 (2000) (discussing other
institutions that settle investment disputes).
4. See Ahmed Sadek EI-Kosheri, ICSID Arbitration andDeveloping Countries, 8
ICSID REv.-FILJ 104 (1993) (arguing that ICSID was established to encourage foreign
investment in developing countries and not in the industrialized West).
5. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 5 I.L.M 532 (1965) [hereinafter ICSID
Convention]. The ICSID Convention came into force on October 14, 1966. See also
Report of the Executive Directors on the Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 5 I.L.M. 524
(1965) [hereinafter ICSID Report]. In addition, ICSID provides "Additional Facility
Rules" for the settlement of disputes that do not fall within the purview of the ICSID
Convention. The "Additional Facility Rules" are applicable where either party to a
dispute is a state that has not ratified the ICSID Convention or is a national of such a
state, or where the legal dispute does not arise directly out of an investment. See Article
2 of ICSID Additional Facility Rules ICSID/11 April 2006. For an article-by-article
commentary on the ICSID Convention, see CHRISTOPH H. SCHREuER, THE ICSID CONVENTION:
A COMMENTARY (2001). See also MOSHE HIRSCH, THE ARBITRATION MECHANISM OF
THE INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES (1993);
Lucy REED ET AL., GUIDE TO ICSID ARBITRATION (2004).
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the Third World. Nevertheless, the question remains whether ICSID has
been able to facilitate economic development in the Third World. While
this might be difficult to determine without empirical research, an
examination of ICSID's work in balancing the needs of the Third World
and foreign investors, seems a modest and appropriate endeavor to
undertake in this article.
Because of its focus on international investment dispute settlement as
opposed to international commercial arbitration or inter-state arbitration,
ICSID is situated in a somewhat complicated position in present international
legal discourse. 6 While international commercial arbitration focuses on
dispute settlement between private parties, and inter-state arbitration involves
only states, investment arbitration oscillates between international commercial
arbitration and interstate arbitration.7 ICSID sits at the margins of
international commercial arbitration and inter-state arbitration and
borrows from both types of established dispute settlement mechanisms.
However, because international investment arbitration involves states
and foreign investors, it is more complicated as it implicates the
commercial interests of private parties, and states' obligations and rights
with all the public interest strings attached. This article questions ICSID's
ability to respond to the inevitable multiplicity of interests that arise in
investment dispute settlement, especially in relation to Third World
states and foreign investors.
In purporting to provide a balanced approach to investment dispute
settlement between the Third World and capital exporting states, which
are mostly developed states, ICSID was established to play a dual rolesettle foreign investment disputes (through arbitration and conciliation)
and in the process, facilitate the flow of investment to states that need it,
especially in the Third World. ICSID has adequately responded to
investment protection but whether or not it has achieved the second goal
6.

For a historical account of foreign investment arbitration, see Matthew Cobb,

The Development of Arbitration in Foreign Investment, 16 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 48

(2001).
161
Although
ICSID offers both arbitration and conciliation facilities, conciliation has not been a major
feature of ICSID dispute settlement, as only five of those cases have been submitted and
two were settled. See Ibrahim Shihata & Antonio Parra, The Experience of the International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, 14 ICSID REv.-FILJ 299 (1999) (hereinafter
Shihata & Parra, Experience of ICSID]. Since the article was written, there have been
two other conciliation cases. See ICSID, List of Concluded Cases, http://www.worldbank.
org/icsid/cases/conclude.htm.
7.

M. SORNARAJAH, THE SETTLEMENT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES

(2000) [hereinafter SORNARAJAH, SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES].

is arguable, as there is no empirical research to that effect.8 It has
become a forum of choice for foreign investors seeking to settle disputes
that arise in the course of investment in host states, especially Third
World states. The Centre settles legal disputes that arise out of investments
between contracting parties and nationals of other contracting parties. 9
An overwhelming percentage of ICSID arbitrations are initiated by
foreign investors from developed states against Third World states.
Since the establishment of ICSID, only few arbitral proceedings have
been initiated against developed states.' 0 Even more significantly, all
110 cases that are presently pending before ICSID were initiated by
foreign investors against non-(high income) Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) states.11 This data suggest that
ICSID arbitration is more relevant to Third World states and raises12
questions as to why they are more prone to investment disputes.
Indeed investor-state arbitration has been referred to as a "Third World"
type of investment regime. 13
Since its inception, ICSID has acquired growing importance both to
Third World states and foreign investors for several reasons. First,
ICSID specializes in the settlement of foreign investment disputes. This
8.

Jose E. Alvarez, The Emerging Foreign Direct Investment Regime, ASIL

PROC. 94-95 (2005). In discussing the foreign direct investment (FDI) regime generally,

of which ICSID is an important part, Professor Alvarez states as follows: "There are also
different assessments about whether the FDI regime has worked. If the aim of some of
these treaties is to advance political-strategic alliances, there is little doubt investment
treaties have achieved that. Furthermore, if the goal is to improve the lot of the foreign
investor, the FDI regime has been successful in that realm. But if the goal of investment
treaties is to increase the actual flow of FDI to LDCs, the UN Conference on Trade and
Development and World Bank Studies to date have failed to establish any clear causeand-effect relationship .. " Id.
9. ICSID Convention, supranote 5, art. 25.
10. The arbitral proceedings initiated against developed states under ICSID's
auspices include one against Iceland, another against New Zealand, one against Spain,
and three against the United States under NAFTA. See ICSID, List of Concluded Cases,
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/conclude.htm.
11. See ICSID, List of Pending Cases, http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/
pending.htm. This is the figure presented on ICSID's website as of April 10, 2007. See
the World Bank's categorization of countries, http://web.worldbankorg/WBSITE/EXTERNAIJ
DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:20421402-pagePK:64133150-piPK:64133175-th
eSitePK:239419,00.html#Highincome.
12. See generally, Jan Paulsson, Third World Participationin International
Investment Arbitration, 2 ICSID REv.-FILJ 19 (1987) (arguing that arbitration is a
neutral process where parties participate on an equal footing and Third World sates are
no longer prejudiced by the system in any way).
13. Thomas W. Walde, Investment Arbitration Under the Energy CharterTreatyFrom Dispute Settlement to Treaty Implementation, 12 ARB. INT'L 429, 446 (1996)
[hereinafter Walde, From Dispute Settlement to Treaty Implementation]. Professor
Walde argues that it was not feasible to apply investor-state arbitration only to the
Commonwealth of Independent States under the Energy Charter Treaty without
extending such discipline to Western states. Id.
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is important because foreign investment has become a major contributor
to capital by which Third World states seek to fuel their economies.
Second, there is a recent proliferation of bilateral investment treaties
(BITs), which usually include Third World state parties, with ICSID
arbitration clauses for the settlement of disputes. Third, in a bid to attract
foreign investment, many Third World states have enacted investment
promotion legislation that refer disputes to ICSID. 14 Fourth, ICSID is an
arm of the World Bank-an institution that continually reiterates its
commitment to development and is one of the major international
financial institutions (IFIs) that make decisions that affect Third World
states.15 In addition, ICSID arbitration clauses are included not only in
BITs and domestic investment promotion legislation, but also in
multilateral instruments including the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), 16 the Colonia Protocol for Reciprocal Promotion
and Protection1 8 of MERCOSUR Investments, 17 and the Energy Charter
Treaty (ECT)

14. See generally, Antonio Parra, Provisions on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes in Modern Investment Laws, Bilateral Investment Treaties and Multilateral
Instruments on Investment, 12 ICSID REV.-FILJ 287 (1997). Parra considers these
instruments as reflecting a consensus favoring investment liberalization and highly
protective foreign investment standards. Also, he notes that industrialized states have
only made investment protection commitments among themselves in the context of
NAFTA and the ECT. Id.
15.
For an example of the World Bank's development agenda for a region and its
concept of governance by which it seeks to regulate Third World states, see GRAHAM
HARRISON, THE WORLD BANK AND AFRICA: THE CONSTRUCTION OF GOVERNANCE STATES

(2004).
16. North America Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 1120, Dec. 19,
1992, 32 I.L.M. (1993). On NAFTA investor-state dispute settlement, see generally,
Robert K. Paterson, A New Pandora's Box? Private Remedies for Foreign Investors
under the North American Free Trade Agreement, 8 WILLIAMETTE J. INT'L L. & Disp.
RESOL. 77 (2000); J. Anthony VanDuzer, NAFTA Chapter11 to Date: The Progress of a
Work in Progress, in WHOSE RIGHTS? THE NAFTA CHAPTER 11 DEBATE 47, 47 (Laurie
Ritchie Dawson ed., 2002).
17. Jan. 1, 1994, approved by Decision No. 11/93 of the Common Market Council,
art. 9(4). The Colonia Protocol is one of the Protocols to the Treaty Establishing a
Common Market between the Argentine Republic, the Federative Republic of Brazil, the
Republic of Paraguay and the Eastern Republic of Uruguay (Treaty of Asuncion), Mar.
26, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1041 (1991).
18. Energy Charter Treaty, art. 26(4), Dec. 17, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 373, 381 (1995),
reprinted in 10 ICSID REv.-FILJ 258 (1995). See Walde, From Dispute Settlement to
Treaty Implementation, supra note 13; Thomas Walde, Investment Arbitration under the
Energy Charter Treaty: An Overview of key Issues, in ARBITRATING FOREIGN INVESTMENT
DISPUTES 193 (2004).

In order to understand ICSID's relationship with the Third World, it is
important to note that like most of the international economic order,
ICSID dispute settlement is multifaceted. The institution is not autonomous
but is situated at the intersection of law (the ICSID Convention and
rules, including applicable procedural and substantive laws, and arbitral
tribunals); politics (the broader framework of the Developed World/Third
World relations); and economics (World Bank lending and surveillance,
and World Bank administered dispute settlement institutions). In addition
to these intersections, international investment dispute settlement, including
the ICSID mechanism, addresses investment disputes that often implicate
issues of international magnitude that affect the welfare of local populations
like economic development, environmental protection and human rights.
Also, investment dispute settlement now includes several relevant actors
with different interests-transnational corporations (TNCs), developed
country home states, capital importing Third World states, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that argue that they espouse
interests that affect individuals. This article focuses on ICSID's investment
dispute settlement, particularly involving Third World states, within this
broader framework. It suggests that more often than not, ICSID tribunals
are preoccupied with the commercial interests of foreign investors even
though ICSID occupies a position where it can develop robust analyses
of investment and investment related issues. While the protection of
foreign investment is a necessary and legitimate endeavor, a lopsided
commitment to investment protection without adequate attention to other
interests might not bode well for the continued development of an
international law on foreign investment that reflects the interests of all
relevant actors. And of course, a neglect of the interests of foreign investors
is not the strategy to adopt either. Rather, it is argued in this article that
in order to ensure that ICSID retains its relevance and legitimacy within
the international order, ICSID tribunals need to constantly take multiple
and diverse interests into account in settling investment disputes. For
investor-state arbitration is not only about investor protection, it also
impacts significantly on states and the people that they represent.
In seeking to contribute a perspective that offers optimistic suggestions
for incorporating the interests of Third World peoples in ICSID dispute
settlement, while recognizing ICSID's limitations, the article proceeds in
stages that allow for a systematic discussion of the issues that relate to
ICSID's relationship with the Third World.1 9 Each substantive part
19. The analysis in this article could proceed in several ways. For example, one
could decide to address procedural issues. However, I find it pertinent to address
fundamental issues that will ensure ICSID's continued relevance in settling investment
disputes that involve Third World parties.
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addresses the three-pronged issues of the aims of ICSID, its effectiveness in
resolving disputes involving Third World states, and recommendations
for enhanced effectiveness. Part two discusses ICSID's neoliberal roots
and its continued subscription to neoliberal economic principles, through
an analysis of the historical development of investment arbitration generally,
and the institution in particular, and ICSID's aims as defined in its
founding documents. Part three analyzes ICSID's dispute settlement
relationship with the Third World and the latter's adoption of an ambivalent
posture due to the conflicting paradigms that Third World capital
importing states on one hand, and TNCs on the other hand, sometimes
adhere to. The article does not ignore the fact that some Third World states
are capital exporters in some instances, but often and especially within
ICSID's context, they are mostly capital importers, and usually defendants
before ICSID tribunals. Part four provides suggestions for enhancing ICSID's
effectiveness and ensuring its continued relevance in the international
economic order. The last part concludes the article on the note that
ICSID has the potential to accommodate diverse interests and contribute
significantly to the development of an international law on foreign
investment that reflects the paradigms of a constantly evolving global
society.
II.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEO-LIBERAL INVESTMENT
PROTECTION MECHANISM

International investment arbitration has always generated ideological
conflicts involving capital importers (mostly Third World countries) and
capital exporters (mostly developed countries). At the time ICSID was
established, it was a novel institution charged with facilitating the
settlement of investment disputes between states and foreign investors.
Its establishment was a particularly ingenuous measure since non-state
actors did not have international legal personality at the time. Even
today, the position of these actors as subjects of international law is still
questionable. 20 In addition to providing an institutionalized mechanism
that allows foreign investors to be parties to ICSID proceedings, it
excludes recourse to diplomatic protection and separates its dispute

20. See generally JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW (2nd ed., 2006); Jonathan I. Charney, TransnationalCorporationsand Developing
Public InternationalLaw, DUKE L.J. 748 (1983).

settlement mechanism from municipal legal systems. 2 1 ICSID also
established a unique and limitedjurisdiction ratione materiae (disputes
must arise directly from an investment) and jurisdiction ratione
personae (one disputing party must be a state or constituent subdivision
or agency of a state that has ratified the ICSID Convention and the other,
a national of another ICSID member).2 2 In addition, it provides for an
internal annulment mechanism; 2 3 and a relatively more effective enforcement
mechanism compared to other dispute settlement facilities.24 However,
aside from the ingenuity of the drafters of the ICSID Convention, there
were several other factors that shaped the emergence and character of
ICSID, as it was not established on a blank historical page. The creation
of the institution was mainly a reaction to what many capital exporting
countries and their multinational corporations considered as threats to
their economic interests in the Third World. 5 And, through the years,
ICSID has established itself as foreign investors' dispute settlement
institution of choice for settling investment disputes involving foreign
investors and Third World states. 6
The ICSID Convention was drafted in the heydays of Third World
nationalist convergence and at a time when the vestiges of direct colonial
domination were crumbling. Prior to this time, foreign investment
protection was assured through the instrumentality of merging the legal
systems of the colonized and the colonizer and where this failed, or
where the territory in question was not a colony of any colonial power
of the time, through gunboat diplomacy.2 7 As such, the need for an
international regime on foreign investment protection was minimal.
Colonial domination and gunboat diplomacy as the primary choices for
investment protection reflect the power asymmetry that prevailed in the
colonial era, and, which continued to influence the reaction of Third
World states to foreign investment even after the end of direct colonial
domination. Indeed, the development of the international law on foreign
21. ICSID Convention, supra note 5, art. 26-27.
22. Id. art. 25.
23. Id. art. 52. See Shihata & Parra, Experience of ICSID, supra note 7, for an
analysis of ICSID's annulment mechanism.
24. ICSID Convention, supra note 5, art. 53-55
25. See generally SORNARAJAH, INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT,
supra note 1, at 19, 37.
26. In a discussion of international arbitration and ICSID's relationship with the
World Bank, Professor Graving asserts that "it borders on an axiom to observe that
ICSID arbitration is preferable to any other when its jurisdictional requirements can be
met." He states that ICSID assures a level of efficacy unequaled elsewhere. Richard J.
Graving, The InternationalArbitration Institutions: How Good a Job are they Doing, 4
AM. U. J. INT'L. L. & POL'Y 319, 365 (1989).
27. SORNARAJAH, INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 1, at
19, 37.

ICSID

[VOL. 8: 345, 2007]

SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J.

investment has always involved power exertion and struggles within the
international order, not only among states but also with non-state actors
like TNCs and NGOs exerting significant influence in this area of the
law.
Based on the "colonial origins of international law", many Third
28
World states perceived a need to redefine international economic law.
Thus, they espoused views at the United Nations General Assembly,
which were usually contrary to those of many industrialized states.
These efforts culminated in such declarations like the Declaration on
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources,2 9 the Charter of Economic
Rights and Duties of States, 30 and the much contested Declaration on the
Establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO).31 In
addition to the changing views of Third World states in international
forums, the wave of nationalizations that accompanied the decolonization
movement posed threats to the economic interests of erstwhile colonial
powers and necessitated the development of investment protection

28. On Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) and the work of
TWAIL scholars that analyze and critique international law's engagement with the Third
World, see generally Karin Mickelson, Rhetoric and Rage: Third World Voices in
InternationalLegal Discourse, 16 WIS. INT'L L.J. 353 (1998); Makau wa Mutua, What is
TWA1L?, 94 ASIL PROC. 31 (2000); B.S. Chimni, Third World Approaches to
InternationalLaw: A Manifesto in THE THIRD WORLD AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER: LAW,
POLITICS AND GLOBALIZATION

47 (Antony Anghie et al., eds., 2003); Obiora Chinedu

Okafor, Newness, Imperialism and InternationalLegal Reform in Our Time: A TWAIL
Perspective, 43 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 171 (2005); James Thuo Gathii, Alternative and
Critical: The Contribution of Research and Scholarship on Developing Countries to
InternationalLegal Theory, 41 HARV. INT'L L. J. 263 (2000); Antony Anghie, Francisco
de Vitoria and the Colonial Origins of International Law, 5 Soc. & LEG. STUD. 321

(1996).
29. G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), 17 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217
(Dec. 14, 1962). See generally NICO SCHRIJVER, SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL RESOURCES:
BALANCING RIGHTS AND DUTIES

(1997).

30. G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), UN GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. (No. 31) at 50, U.N.
Doc. A/3235 (Dec. 12, 1974).
31. G.A. Res. 3201 (S-VI), 6 (Special) U.N. GAOR, 6th Spec. Sess. Supp. No. 1,
at 3, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974) (May 1, 1974). On the question of the success or
otherwise of the NIEO, see generally Mickelson, supra note 28; Obiora Chinedu Okafor,
The Status and Effect of the Right to Development in Contemporary InternationalLaw:
Towards a South-North Entente, 7 AFR. J. INT'L. & COMP. L. 865 (1995); Thomas M.
Franck, Lessons of the Failure of the NIEO, in CANADIAN COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL
LAW PROCEEDINGS

(Canadian Council on International Law, 1986) 82;

BALAKRISHNAN

RAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM BELOW: DEVELOPMENT, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
AND THIRD WORLD RESISTANCE 82-91 (2003); Obiora Chinedu Okafor, Poverty, Agency
and Resistance in the Future of InternationalLaw: An African Perspective, 27 THIRD
WORLD

Q. 799, 808 (2006).

mechanisms separate from the domestic jurisdiction of states. Since
World War II, investment disputes became increasingly internationalized
(or delocalized), as they were subject to international arbitration and
application of international law, and not just the municipal law of the
host state as the applicable law. This was mainly due to the conception
of TNCs and their home states that the application of the host state's law
and adjudication by domestic tribunals in the host state might be
prejudicial to TNCs' interests.3 2
Internationalization further permeated the system through frequent
insertion of arbitration clauses, stabilization clauses, and choice of law
clauses into investment contracts. These clauses indicated that investment
contracts were not subject to municipal law.3 3 In the 1950s, three international
arbitral awards further helped to shape the internationalization of
investment disputes. In Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast) Ltd. v.
Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, 34 Ruler of Qatar v. International Marine Oil Co.
Ltd. 35 and Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Co., 36 the contracts

clearly had the closest connections to the laws of the host states.37 Dicta
in the awards suggest that the arbitrators considered that the applicable
law was inescapably the domestic laws of the host states according to
prevailing legal authority at the time. Like in the Qatar and Aramco
arbitrations, in the Abu Dhabi Arbitration, the arbitrator, Lord Asquith,
however, found that domestic laws of the host state were not mature
enough to deal with petroleum disputes emerging from state contracts
and as a result of the perceived lacuna, applied the general principles of
law recognized by "civilized nations" to the dispute.
Internationalization of foreign investment disputes was the rational
choice for industrialized states at the time, given the history of their
interaction with Third World states. Generally, internationalization reflected
a discomfort with the laws of Third World states and their ability to
ensure justice for foreign investors and to protect their commercial
interests. By placing investment disputes within the international domain,
former colonial powers could ensure that their economic interests

32. Jan Paulsson, Delocalization of International Commercial Arbitration: When
and Why it Matters, 32 ICLQ 53 (1983).
33.
SORNARAJAH, SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DispUTEs, supra note 7, ch. 8.
34.

The Abu Dhabi Arbitration, 18 I.L.R. 144 (1951).

35.
36.

The Qatar Arbitration, 20 I.L.R. 534 (1953).
The Aramco Arbitration, 27 I.L.R 117 (1958).

37.
SORNARAJAH, SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES, supra note 7, at 251-52.
See also Sapphire Int'l Petroleum Ltd. v. Nat'l Iranian Oil Co., 35 I.L.R. 136 (Int'l Arb.
Trib. 1963); Texaco Overseas Oil Petroleum Co. v. Libyan Arab Republic, 53 I.L.R 389
(I.C.J. Arb. 1977) [hereinafter Texaco Arbitration]; Lord McNair, The General Principlesof
Law Recognized by CivilizedNations, 33 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1 (1957).
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remained within structures that were accessible to (and dominated by)
them at the time.
ICSID was established in the euphoria of these ideologically charged
times under the auspices of the World Bank and filled the need to protect
foreign investment in the Third World. 38 The drafters sought to effect a
balance between the needs of investors and Third World states, and took
caution and care in ensuring that the consultative process included as
many Third World states as were willing to participate. 39 In spite of the
suspicion of international arbitration, a considerable number of Third
World states, except most Latin American countries, signed the ICSID
Convention at its inception. Several reasons could account for the early
acceptance of the ICSID Convention. These rationales mostly reflect
factors that Third World states could have considered, including the
potential benefits and losses from being parties to the ICSID Convention.
First, without engaging in a normative consideration of the nature of
participation, many Third World states probably felt some connection to
the institution, having participated in the consultative process that led to
the adoption of the ICSID Convention. This was not the case with most
international institutions of the time, which had been established when
these states were under formal colonial domination. Second, it is likely
that the general rationale provided for the establishment of ICSID-

38. Western states included territories under their control-for example, Southern
Rhodesia (Zimbabwe)--within the jurisdiction of ICSID within a few years of ratifying
the Convention, even though some of these territories were initially excluded. See
ICSID, SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT 1982/1983 6-7 (1983). In 1968, the United

Kingdom designated twenty of its subdivisions including Antigua, Belize, Dominica,
Hong Kong, and Seychelles as competent parties to disputes before ICSID. See Annex 2
of ICSID, CONTRACTING STATES AND ACTIONS TAKEN BY THEM PURSUANT TO THE
CONVENTION (As OF NOVEMBER 15, 1975) 8-9 (ICSID/8/Rev.2).
39. For example, twenty-nine African states and the African and Malagasy

Organization for Economic Cooperation (OAMCE) were represented at the Consultative
Meeting of Legal Experts held at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia from December 16-20, 1963.
See ICSID, ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE ORIGIN OF THE FORMULATION OF
THE CONVENTION (Volume 2, Part 1) 236-95 (1970).

Many other Third World states

were included in other such Consultative Meetings that were held in Chile (where Latin
American countries expressed their reservations on conflicts between the proposed
Convention and their constitutions which embodied the equality of foreigners and
nationals), and in Thailand. See Documents 27 & 31 respectively, in ICSID, DOCUMENTS
CONCERNING THE ORIGIN OF THE CONVENTION Vol. 2: 1. It is however, possible to query
the character of Third World participation in drafting the ICSID Convention, whether it
was substantive or merely procedural.

40

attracting foreign investment--contributed to the institution's attractiveness.
Third World states sought and still seek foreign investment to fuel their
economies and an institution that sought to facilitate the flow of such
investment cannot easily be ignored. Third, a possible explanation for
the suspicion of international arbitration and the simultaneous signing of
the ICSID Convention is that Third World states might have thought that
ratifying the ICSID Convention would not necessarily amount to being
subject to the Centre's jurisdiction, as further consent is required before
ICSID can assume jurisdiction.4 ' However, if this was the position, it is
highly misplaced given the prevailing possibilities of unilateral consent
to arbitration that has been referred to "arbitration without privity 'A2 that
arise from BITs, domestic legislation, regional agreements like the NAFTA
and sectoral agreements like the ECT. Fourth, commentators have argued
that ratifying the ICSID Convention served as a possible guarantee of
obtaining loans from IFIs, the World Bank-the parent body of ICSIDinclusive.43 Thus, with developed nations' need to protect foreign
investment and the Third World's desire to increase private capital
flows, ICSID found its place in the multifarious world of international
investment dispute settlement.
A. The Promise of ICSID
As stated earlier, ICSID was a novel type of institution at the time 44it
was established, given its institutionalization of investor-state arbitration.
It sought to establish a balance between the conflicts surrounding the
interests and positions of developed capital exporting states and Third
World capital importing states. The institution purportedly achieved this

40. Paragraph 12 of the ICSID Report states inter alia that "adherence to the
Convention by a country would provide additional inducement and stimulate a larger
flow of private international investment into its territories, which is the primary purpose
of the Convention."
41. ICSID Convention, supra note 5, art. 25(1).
42. Jan Paulsson, Arbitration without Privity, 10 ICSID REv.-FILJ 232 (1995). It
is important to note that not all references to ICSID in domestic legislation and
international investment agreements amount to consent. On this point, see Aron Broches,
Bilateral Investment Treaties and Arbitration of Investment Disputes, in THE ART OF
ARBITRATION: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL

ARBITRATION:

LIBER AMICORUM PIETER

SANDERS 1912-1982 63 (Jan C. Schultz & Albert Jan van den Berg eds., 1982). However,

majority of recent ICSID cases arise from consent provided in BITs. See David R.
Sedlak, ICSID's Resurgence in InternationalInvestment Arbitration:Can the Momentum
Hold?, 23 PENN. ST. INT'L L. REv. 147, 160 (2004).
43.
M. SORNARAJAH, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: THE PROBLEM
OF STATE CONTRACTS 43 (1990).

44. The first recorded ad hoc investor-state arbitration was the 1930 Lena
Goldfield Arbitration. See Arthur Nussbaum, The Arbitration between the Lena
Goldfields, Ltd. and the Soviet Government, 36 CORNELL L.Q. 31 (1950).
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balance through provisions in the ICSID Convention discussed in part
three of this article, specifically, the applicable law and the exclusion of
diplomatic protection by the home state of the foreign investor once a
dispute is submitted to ICSID, thereby seeking to depoliticize investment
disputes.45 However, as discussed in part four of this article, ICSID did
not anticipate concerns that emerged in the last quarter of the 20th
century. These concerns of international law that ICSID did not
anticipate mostly include the public interests of the local populations in
the geopolitical zones that are affected by investment activities. However, in
part four of this article, I suggest that it is possible to accommodate
diverse and even conflicting interests within ICSID's dispute settlement
mechanism, noting that the accommodation of erstwhile marginalized
interests will require a deliberate reorientation regarding the purpose of
investment dispute settlement.
ICSID's founding documents reveal three broad purposes that the
institution sought to achieve. They reflect the tenets of an institution
that subscribes to a neoliberal economic paradigm, as ICSID sought to
enshrine the legal/political and the public/private divide by excluding the
state from the sphere of foreign investment, which is considered by some
as a private sphere.46 The ICSID Convention represents a neoliberal
document in that it seeks to project a form of neutrality in investment
45. See generally IBRAHIM F.I. SHIHATA, TOWARDS A GREATER DEPOLITICIZATION
OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES: THE ROLES OF ICSID AND MIGA (1993) [hereinafter SHIHATA,
DEPOLITICIZATION OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES] initiallypublished at I ICSID REv.-FILJ 1
(1986). See also Augustus A. Agyemang, The Suitability of Arbitration for Settling
"Political" Investment Disputes Involving African States, 6 J. WORLD TRADE 123 (1988)

(where the author differentiates between legal investment disputes and political investment
disputes and argues that the latter category of disputes is better settled through negotiation.
His argument that negotiation is a better means of settling political investment disputes
involving African states (all part of the Third World), almost totally writes ICSID out of
the picture of the African investment protection scene. This is important given that many
of the disputes that arise in relation to investment-for example, nationalizations
pursuant to the espousal of radically different economic or social policies-could
conveniently fall under Agyemang's categories of political investment disputes).
46. See Amr Shalakany, Arbitration and the Third World. A Pleafor Reassessing
Bias Under the Specter of Neoliberalism, 41 HARV. INT'L L.J. 419 (2000) (arguing that
Libya lost in the Libyan Oil Nationalization cases, including the Texaco Arbitration
not because it did anything illegal but because it carried out a political act). The
public/private distinction exists at several levels. One is the Lockean dichotomy between
the domestic sphere and civil society, which is critiqued by feminist scholars. Another,
which is relevant to international investment and other economic activities, is the
distinction between politics on the one hand, as public and economics on the other as
private. See Hilary Charlesworth, The Public/Private Distinction and the Right to
Development in InternationalLaw, 12 AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 190 (1988/89).

and dispute settlement, facilitate free markets, and discourage government
participation or intervention in international investment. Also pertinent
to the liberal investment agenda is investor-state arbitration, which provides
an avenue for transferring disputes from the political sphere to the legal.
However, experience has dictated that it is difficult to totally exclude
governmental intervention in foreign investment. While this is true for
developed states, it is particularly relevant for Third World states as their
economies and populations are more vulnerable to the negative effects of
foreign investment. This perhaps, explains in part, why Third World
states constitute the majority of defendants before ICSID as the state of
their economies dictate the necessity for some level of government
intervention in foreign investment.
The first of ICSID's three-fold promise is directed toward foreign
investors. ICSID was clearly established to protect foreign investment in
the Third World through the provision of facilities for settling
investment disputes between contracting states and foreign investors.
The vacuum left by the crumbling direct colonial hold on many Third
World states in the mid 20th century necessitated the establishment of
such an institution. Secondly, one of the major rationales that proponents
espouse for the establishment of ICSID-referred to as the "primary
purpose" of the ICSID Convention-is the promotion of investment
flows to Third World states. ICSID was established within the first
development decade that spanned the 1960s, at the time when "it became
increasingly clear that if the plans established for the growth in the
economies of developing countries were to be realized, it would be
necessary to supplement the resources flowing to these countries from
bilateral and multilateral governmental sources by additional investments
originating in the private sector. 4 7 This was a time when the World
Bank began to have a foothold in the Third World, just after the
establishment of the International Development Association (IDA)-the
World Bank's arm that provides development loans-in 1960. Articulating
the reason for the establishment of ICSID, Ibrahim Shihata, then
Secretary General of ICSID stated that "ICSID should not be viewed
merely as a mechanism of conflict resolution. It should be regarded as an
effective instrument of international public policy which is meant in the
final analysis to secure a stable and increasing flow
,,48 of resources to
However, even
developing countries under reasonable conditions.
though it is touted that ICSID was established to both settle investment

47.

ICSID, ANALYSIS OF DocUMENTs CONCERNING THE ORIGIN OF THE FORMULATION

OF THE CONVENTION

48.

(Volume 1) 2 (1970).

Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Introduction by the Secretary-General,in ICSID, 1984

ANNUAL REPORT 5 (1984).
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disputes and facilitate the flows of private capital to the Third World, the
ICSID Convention only substantively provides for the former. References
to the latter rationale are mostly included in the ICSID Report49 and it
has gained prominence mostly through anecdotal repetition.
The ICSID Report states that the ICSID Convention is premised on
the position that guaranteeing investment protection by providing a
mechanism for dispute resolution fosters the flow of private capital to
host states. As such, ICSID was established to be more than an
investment dispute settlement institution; it was meant to facilitate
investment flows with a view to economic development. This position
was reiterated in Amco Asia Corp. v. Indonesia, where the tribunal cited
the ICSID Convention's preamble with approval and went on to argue
that protecting investments amounts to the protection of the "general
interest of development and of developing countries.",5' Thus, ICSID's
third promise combines the first two purposes in the claim that it
promotes mutual confidence between host states and foreign investors.
Paragraph 9 of the ICSID Report states:
In submitting the attached Convention to governments, the Executive Directors

are prompted by the desire to strengthen the partnership between countries in
the cause of economic development. The creation of an institution designed to
facilitate the settlement of disputes between States and foreign investors can be
a major step toward promoting an atmosphere of mutual confidence and thus
stimulating a larger flow of private international
capital into those countries
52
which wish to attract it. (Emphasis added)

Professor Toope captures the argument adequately when he challenges
the mutual confidence position articulated in the ICSID Report above.
He states that the assertion of balanced interests is, "at best, disingenuous. 53
For Professor Toope, the position that a larger flow of private capital is
desirable can be legitimately challenged, given the coexistence of a
variety of economic systems. He also argues that the idea of confidence is a
Western, market oriented conception of economic policy; that the ICSID
49. This is the report of the Executive Directors attached to the ICSID
Convention that explains the need for and the provisions of the Convention.
50. ICSID Report, supra note 5, para. 12.
51. Amco v. Indonesia, 23 I.L.M. 351, 369 (1984); 1 ICSID REP. 413.
52. Paragraph 13 of the ICSID Report also states that "while the broad objective of

the Convention is to encourage a larger flow of international investment, the provisions
of the Convention maintain a careful balance between the interests of investors and those
of host States .... "
53.

STEPHEN

J. TOOPE,

MIXED INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: STUDIES IN ARBITRATION

BETWEEN STATES AND PRIVATE PERSONS 219-20 (1990).

Convention does not "increase a developing state's "confidence" that a
foreign private investor will behave in a manner consistent with public
policy or national aspirations"; and that the foreign investor54 is the only
party whose "level of confidence is significantly enhanced.,
Essentially, ICSID's argument that economic development arises from
the protection of foreign investors and private capital stems from a
subscription to neoliberal economic theory. 55 Economic liberalism is
premised on the assumption that foreign investment is beneficial to host
states. As such, it flows from this premise that such investment should
be protected through the provision of investment protection mechanisms
including international dispute resolution. Also, it is thought that foreign
investments enhance the Third World's development and that "the entirely
altruistic reasons for which foreign investments are made are worthy of
protection by international law."' 56 However, while it is pertinent that
foreign investment is protected, it is equally important not to ignore the
negative effects of such investment and extend protection to those
affected by the detrimental effects.57
Id. at 220-21.
For conflicting economic theories on foreign investment, see SORNARAJAH,
INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 1, at 50-65. See also,
Kenneth Vandevelde, Sustainable Liberalism and the InternationalInvestment Regime,
19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 373 (1998) (for a general survey of political economic theories
applicable to foreign investment). On stages of economic growth in neoclassical economic
theory, see W.W. RoSTOw, THE STAGES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 4-16 (1960); W.W.
RoSTOw, THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH (1962). On the different circumstances of
the West and the post World War II Third World, see ARTURO ESCOBAR, ENCOUNTERING
DEVELOPMENT: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF THE THIRD WORLD 83 (1995).
54.
55.

56.

See SORNARAJAH, INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note

1, at 342 (positing that this argument can be dismissed as being without merit).
57. History is replete with examples of mass disasters that have occurred directly
from foreign investment. The Union Carbide disaster in Bhopal in India provides a
case in point. See generally UPENDRA BAXI, INCONVENIENT FORUM AND CONVENIENT
CATASTROPHE: THE BHOPAL CASE (1986); UPENDRA BAXI & THOMAS PAUL, MASS
DISASTERS AND MULTINATIONAL LIABILITY: THE BHOPAL CASE (1986). Most of the time,

the local population is the worst hit by the disasters and they are usually written out of
the picture of foreign investment. An example is provided by the West African Gas
Pipeline project, funded by TNCs, financially guaranteed by the IDA and the Multilateral
Investment Guarantee Agency and financially supported by the United States Agency for
International Development and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation and has the
potential support of the European Investment Bank, the United Kingdom Export Credit
Guarantee Department and the United States Export-Import Bank. The operating
companies are registered not in any of the four African countries involved-Nigeria,
Togo, Benin and Ghana-but in Bermuda, an overseas territory of the United Kingdom.
Friends of the Earth reports that the consortium of operating companies have stated
clearly that they will not be responsible for the indirect impacts of the project and as a
result, the local people will have no means of seeking redress from the various violations
that have been outlined as consequences of implementing the project. It is intriguing that
IFIs can only see or rather, acknowledge the potential benefits of the project. They
refuse to acknowledge the potential negative impacts on the masses. See generally

360

[VOL. 8: 345, 2007]

ICSID
SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J.

In addition to its two principal functions-protecting foreign
investment through the facilitation of investment dispute settlement and
facilitating economic development through the promotion of investment
flows- -ICSID also performs several secondary functions. 58 These include
the design of model clauses that refer disputes to ICSID, drafting investment
dispute settlement clauses for BITs, 59 publication of investment treaty
and legislation volumes, and the organization of conferences on arbitration
and other topics. Professor Baker notes that over a thousand ICSID model
clauses have been included in investment agreements and treaties.6 °
However, many investment treaties and legislation provide for arbitration
without privity and do not reflect the balance of interests that ICSID's
founding documents purport to achieve. This further enhances the point
that the focus on the protection of foreign investment seems to be more
paramount than the balancing of interests between Third World host
states and foreign investors. For example, even the ICSID Convention and
the ICSID Report envisage situations where states could offer unilateral
consent to submit disputes to ICSID. Under article 25 of the ICSID Convention
and paragraph 24 of the ICSID Report, a host state might give consent to
ICSID jurisdiction in its investment promotion legislation and the
foreign investor may accept this unilateral offer at the time of initiating
proceedings. By enacting such legislation, states give a blanket and general
consent to submit to arbitration without the need for further consent in a
contract. Third World states usually include such provisions in their
investment promotion statutes. 6 1 These statutory provisions have sometimes
formed the basis for ICSID jurisdiction in cases initiated against Third
World defendants.62 Such unilateral consent to investment arbitration
Friends of the Earth International, The Myths of the West African Gas Pipeline (Jan. 2006),
availableat http://www.foei.org/publications/pdfs/wagp-inet.pdf.

58. For example, ICSID's Secretary General often acts as the appointing authority
of arbitrators for ad hoc arbitration usually under the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law's (UNCITRAL) Arbitration Rules. See http://www.worldbank.orgl
icsid/news/n- 16-1-5.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2007).
59. This no longer forms a significant part of the institution's work.
60. JAMES C. BAKER, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES:
THE ROLE OF ICSID AND MIGA 62-67 (1999).
61. See INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES,
INVESTMENT LAWS OF THE WORLD

(Oceana Publications, Inc., 2005) (1977). While the

collection is titled Investment Laws of the World, it only includes investment laws of
132 Third World countries and Eastern European economies in transition. It does not
include the laws of developed states.
62. Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East), Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt
(SPP v. Egypt), 3 ICSID REP. 112, 131 (1995) 45, 57-62; 32 ILM 933 (1993); Manufacturers

generally forecloses the ability to bring claims seeking to protect the
non-commercial interests of Third World peoples before ICSID, as
foreign investors retain the right to initiate arbitration proceedings, a
privilege which the host state does not have under conditions of arbitration
without privity.
From a perusal of ICSID cases, one can conclude that ICSID has
relatively fulfilled its first promise of investment protection, since foreign
investors have ceased the opportunity presented by the availability of the
Centre to seek redress for harms allegedly done to their investments.
The materialization of the second promise of increased investment flows
and Third World development, is however, more difficult to ascertain. In
spite of this difficulty, it is necessary to consider ways that ICSID can
keep its third promise of "mutual confidence" as this is pertinent to its
continued relevance to the Third World. This is necessary in view of the
fact that the ICSID Convention is still in force and parties have recourse
to the institution. As such, the Third World needs to find ways of making
the most of the institution by seeking to enhance its effectiveness in
addressing Third World interests. The balance of the article is dedicated
to that focus. Essentially, I argue that in order to keep ICSID relevant to
the Third World and to foster the fulfillment of its promises, states
should be allowed to determine their own economic policies without
being penalized for adopting policies that do not conform to prevailing
thoughts of IFIs and developed states, as long as such policies will
ameliorate difficult situations in their countries. In addition, they should
have redress for harms arising from foreign investment for foreign
investment, like all investments, includes both detriments as well as
benefits.63
III. ICSID AND THE THIRD WORLD: 40 YEARS OF AMBIVALENCE
Like industrialized states sometimes do, many Third World states
have simultaneously embraced and rejected the neoliberal economic
agenda. 64 On one hand, it has been difficult to avoid the adoption of
Hanover Trust Co. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/89/1 (1993);
Tradex Hellas S.A. v. Republic of Albania, 5 ICSID REP. 47, 70 (2002); Ghaith R. Pharaon v.
Republic of Tunisia, ICSID Case No. ARB/86/I, ICSID/16/Rev. 26 (discontinued). See
also Amazu A. Asouzu, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND AFRICAN
STATES 314-15 (Cambridge University Press, 2001).
63. Professor Louis Wells has noted that about 60 to 70 percent of foreign
investment projects are beneficial to the host country, while in the remaining percentage,
the costs exceed the benefits. Louis T. Wells, Foreign Direct Investment, in ASIA AND
AFRICA: LEGACIES AND OPPORTUNITIES INDEVELOPMENT 337, 341 (David L. Lindauer &
Michael Roemer eds., 1994).
64. In the context of foreign investment, industrialized states also exhibit nationalistic
tendencies. See Kenneth Vandevelde, The PoliticalEconomy of a Bilateral Investment
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neoliberal economic 6policies due to post-debt crisis conditionalities
imposed by the IMF,6 and other factors like the prevailing provisions of
investment agreements and ICSID dispute settlement; and on the other
hand, many of these states have expressed reservations on the utility of
such policies for development. 66 Essentially, these states have encountered
difficulty in espousing alternative economic policies, especially in
bilateral relationships with IFIs and in BIT negotiations, although they
continue to espouse these alternative ideas in multilateral negotiations,
due to their continuous belief in the utility of these alternatives and the
strength in their numbers in the latter fora. As stated earlier, many Third
World states ratified the ICSID Convention when the institution was
first established and many more have become signatories over the years.
Thus, in spite of the inability to measure its benefits to the Third World,
it is difficult to maintain that ICSID is totally devoid of any benefits. It
is possible to assert among other things, 67 that the inclusion of an ICSID
arbitration clause in treaties, agreements and domestic legislation have a
signaling effect on investment flows, as investors may take that as
evidence of a favorable investment environment. 68 However, in spite of

Treaty, 92 AJIL 621 (1998). For example, some industrialized states including France
relied on sovereignty erosion arguments during the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development's (OECD) Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) negotiations,
the European Union sought to restrict the application of the most favored nation clause in
the MAI negotiations and within the World Trade Organization, and the United States
and the European Union continually refuse to liberalize trade in agriculture. On the
arguments marshaled against the adoption of the MAI, see generally Glen Kelley, Note,
Multilateral Investment Treaties: A BalancedApproach to Multinational Corporations,
39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 483 (2001).
65. See generally Sundhya Pahuja, Technologies of Empire. IMF Conditionality
and the Reinscription of the North/South Divide, 13 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 749 (2000).
66. Commentators have sought to explain the ambivalence on the part of Third
World states. See Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties that Hurt Them: Explaining
the Popularity of BilateralInvestment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 639 (1998); Kenneth
Vandevelde, A Brief History of International Investment Agreements, 12 U.C. DAVIS J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 157 (2005); SORNARAJAH, INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT,
supra note 1, at 24.
67. Factors that affect the flow of foreign investment to Third World countries
include a particular country's natural attributes, the size of its market, a large population,
the quality of its infrastructure and work force, and of course, its legal and administrative
structures. Jeswald W. Salacuse, Direct Foreign Investment and the Law in Developing
Countries, 15 ICSID REV.-FILJ 382, 386 (2000).
68. See Eric Neumayer & Laura Spess, Do BilateralInvestment Treaties Increase
Foreign Direct Investment in Developing Countries?, 33 WORLD DEV. 1567 (2005).
Although the article is on the effects of BITs on investment flows, an overwhelming
majority of BITs include ICSID arbitration clauses, and one can extrapolate the possible

ratifying the ICSID Convention, there have been situations where some
states have advanced arguments that are contrary to the position that many
traditional proponents of investment protection and dispute settlement
espouse.
Although ICSID's contribution to investment flows is difficult to
measure, its dispute settlement mandate is relatively clear. ICSID tribunals
have engaged mainly in settling disputes between foreign investors as
claimants and Third World states as defendants. An overwhelming majority
of ICSID cases fall within this category. The most common reaction of states
has been to adopt a legal argument open to defendants-challenging
ICSID's jurisdiction over disputes. The last section of this part discusses
two prominent examples of Third World states' reaction to the
simultaneous initiation of ICSID arbitrations against them. Based on the
ICSID Convention and the ICSID Report's assertions that the institution
would promote mutual confidence between foreign investors and the
Third World, the bulk of this part of the article is dedicated to discussions of
the ICSID Convention's provisions (and some ICSID cases) that seek to
balance the interests of the Third World with those of foreign investors
and their home states. The part includes concise discussions of themes
such as ICSID's treatment of the Third World's development concerns;
the ICSID Convention's provisions on applicable law, scholarly reaction
to the provisions and the practice of ICSID tribunals; ICSID's
depoliticization agenda; and a discussion of Jamaica and Argentina's
reactions to simultaneous initiation of ICSID arbitration against them.
The purpose of this part of the article is to determine how the
provisions of the ICSID Convention that purport to balance the interests
of the Third World and foreign investors play out in practice. First, in
spite of ICSID's claim of providing cooperation for development, this
most relevant issue to the Third World has generally not been a prominent
feature in ICSID jurisprudence. Second, in practice, the provision on the
applicable law has tilted mostly in favor of international law not domestic
law. Finally, although ICSID's purported attempt at depoliticizing investment
disputes is certainly laudable, one cannot separate this from the general
power imbalances in the international economic order. While depoliticization
in practice, seems to have worked more in favor of the foreign investor
within the realm of ICSID, as states are precluded from politicking at the
expense of the foreign investor, disputes cannot be totally depoliticized
between host states and the foreign investors' home states within the
broader context of international economic law and politics.

effects of dispute settlement clauses from the authors' argument on the signaling effects
of BITs.
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A. Development Concerns
The development concerns of Third World states have not featured

before ICSID tribunals. 69 One would have thought that being one of the
major concerns of Third World states that constitute the overwhelming
majority of ICSID defendants, ICSID jurisprudence would be replete
with principles of the (international) law of development, or at least
principles akin to this. y0 Also, given the oft-repeated claim that ICSID
possesses the ability to promote mutual confidence between the Third
World and foreign investors, it is surprising that references to economic
development are sparse in ICSID's jurisprudence. This buttresses the point
that the tribunals' focus has gravitated mainly towards investment
protection.
The most frequently discussed ICSID decision that explicitly considered
issues of economic development is Klockner v. Cameroon. 71 The Klockner
Group signed an agreement with the Government of Cameroon undertaking
to erect a fertilizer plant to be operated as a joint venture between the
parties when completed. After erecting the plant, Klockner alleged nonpayment by the Cameroonian Government while the latter alleged that
the project was poorly implemented. The initial arbitral tribunal read
several duties into the agreement, and noted explicitly that the agreement
was between a TNC and a developing country. The tribunal was of the
opinion that the plant's output was of major importance to the country's
69.
However, some commentators regard the ICSID Convention as "one of the
first links in the international law of development." See Phillipe Kahn, The Law of
Development and Arbitration Tribunals, in INTERNATIONAL LAW OF DEVELOPMENT:
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 163, 166 (Francis Snyder & Peter Slinn eds., 1987).
70. On the international law of development, see generally MILAN BULAJId ,
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT LAW: PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW RELATING TO THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
ORDER (1986); F.V. GARCiA-AMADOR, THE EMERGING INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
DEVELOPMENT: A NEW DIMENSION OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW (1990); THE
RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Subrata et al. eds., 1992); Oscar

Schacter, The Evolving InternationalLaw of Development, 15 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
1-16 (1976). See also R.P. ANAND, CONFRONTATION OR COOPERATION?: INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1987); KOEN DE FEYTER, WORLD DEVELOPMENT
LAW: SHARING RESPONSIBILITY FOR DEVELOPMENT (2001).

71.
Kl6ckner Industrie-Anlagen GmbH v. United Republic of Cameroon & Socidt6
Camerounaise des Engrais, 1 ICSID REV.-FILJ 89 (1986); 2 ICSID REP. 1, 9 (1994).
The award focused primarily on the foreign investor's duty of disclosure. The dissenting
opinion is reported at 2 ICSID REP. at 77 (1994). Both the majority and dissenting
opinions were rendered on October 21, 1983. See Jan Paulsson, The ICSID Klickner v.
Cameroon Award: The Duties of Partners in North-South Economic Development
Agreements, I J. INT'L ARB. 145 (1984).

agricultural sector that formed the foundation of Cameroon's economy.
It concluded that it was not enough to merely construct a fertilizer plant;
the plant had to have the required capacity and be managed in a manner
that fulfilled the attainment of its goals. The tribunal seemed to infer
that the performance of the foreign investment contract had to meet the
development aspirations of a Third World country like Cameroon. In its
decision, the tribunal rejected both the foreign investor's claim and
Cameroon's counterclaim. The Klockner v. Cameroon award was, however,
annulled on the ground inter alia that the tribunal
had failed to apply
72
correctly, the law of Cameroon to the dispute.
The decision in Antoine Goetz v. Republic of Burundi is one that could
have generated a sustained engagement with the economic development
dimensions of Burundi's actions, especially as the tribunal alluded to
the "common good" and "interests of the national economy" that the
Government's decision was meant to serve.73 The decision turned on the
expropriatory effects of Burundi's actions as included in the 1989 BIT
between Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union and Burundi that
formed the basis for ICSID's jurisdiction. The dispute arose from Burundi's
withdrawal of a "free zone certificate" that had earlier granted exemptions
from tax and customs duties to the investor's company. The defendant
state withdrew the certificate on the grounds that the free zone had
ceased to apply to companies engaged in the extraction and sale of ore
and the applicant company fell within this category. Based on the parties'
subsequent agreement, the tribunal did not issue an award but rendered a
decision on liability, finding that the withdrawal of the certificate constituted
a measure tantamount to expropriation, specifically, a measure depriving of
and restricting property. Given that the BIT allowed the application of
both domestic and international law, it would have been well within the
tribunal's power to consider, for example, emerging international laws
and the right to development. While the tribunal's eventual conclusion is
not the focus here and the issue is not about the correctness of the
decision, the point made in this article is that in the absence of the
consideration of the development impacts of Third World states'
decisions and actions vis-d-vis foreign investors, ICSID tribunals might
only be scratching the surface of the disputes and not dealing with the
major catalyst issues behind the disputes. One can garner this from the
72. K1Ockner v. Cameroon, 2 ICSID Rep. at 95 (1994). The annulment decision
was delivered on May 3, 1985.
73. Antoine Goetz v. Republic of Burundi, 15 ICSID REv.-FILJ 457 (2000); 6
ICSID REP. 3, 4-5 (2004), paras. 112, 126. The Tribunal noted at paragraph 126 that "it
is not the Tribunal's role to substitute its own judgment for the discretion of the
Government of Burundi of what are "imperatives of public need.., or of national
interest."
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fact that in spite of the agreement between the parties, and the tribunal's
decision on liability that was reached without adequate consideration of
economic development and the impact of the decision on Burundi,
differences subsequently emerged as to Burundi's compliance with the
terms of the agreement. As a result of the subsequent differences, a new
arbitration request was submitted to ICSID in 2001 and a decision has
not rendered.
Given the history of ICSID tribunals' approach to dispute settlement,
which might not completely dispose of disputes between Third World
states and foreign investors, it is easy to conclude that the institution
cannot account for Third World interests. However, one can choose to
adopt an optimistic view of the institution's ability to turn its attention to
both commercial and non-commercial interests in its dispute settlement
processes. When considered carefully, even though the general background
philosophy of ICSID as an institution is based on the protection of
foreign investors, without much consideration of the multifaceted effects
of foreign investment, ICSID tribunals have the capacity to infuse
awards with development concerns as deemed necessary, as the first
tribunal in Klockner demonstrated. However, like in Klockner, if such
decisions are not founded expressly on the applicable law, they might be
annulled for being manifestly beyond the tribunal's powers. Nevertheless,
this does not have to be so, as such considerations can usually be raised
within the context of the law applicable to the dispute. It remains
important that some tribunals are willing to explore alternative economic
conceptions, particularly those that consider the bigger picture of the
needs of the Third World. Even if the tribunals' concept of development
remains the classical position, the willingness to look to and beyond
investment protection to the economic needs of the country in question
represents a crucial starting point for addressing development concerns.
For ICSID, to fail to accommodate multiple interests is to fail to
transform itself into an international economic order that is constantly
evolving and to fail to see that a myopic view of investment dispute
settlement will not facilitate the institution's relevance in the international
investment order.
B. The Applicable Substantive Law
There are, perhaps, only a few provisions of the ICSID Convention
and their applicability in practice that have generated as much debate as
the substantive law applicable to disputes. The general position has been

that Third World states have favored the applicability of their domestic
law, while foreign investors and their home states have leaned in favor
of the applicability of international law.74 Article 42(1) of the ICSID
Convention seeks to balance these conflicting views by providing that
"the Tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with such rules of law
as may be agreed by the parties. In the absence of such agreement, the
Tribunal shall apply the law of the contracting state party to the dispute
(including its rules on the conflict of laws) and such rules of international
law as may be applicable."
Commentators have sought to interpret article 42(1), many of them
articulating the position that international law is supreme. Aron Broches,
the principal drafter of the ICSID Convention, has opined that an ICSID
"tribunal will first look at the law of the host state and that will in the
first instance be applied to the merits of the dispute. Then the result will
be tested against international law. That process will not involve the
confirmation or the denial of the host state's law, but may result in not
applying it where that law or action taken under that law, violates
international law. In that sense,.... international law is hierarchically
superior to national law under Article 42(l)." 75 Professor Weil has also
noted that, "the reference to the domestic law of the host state, even if
designed only to ascertain whether it is, or is not, compatible with
international law, is indeed a pointless exercise, the sole raison d'etre of
which is to avoid offending the sensibilities of the host state. 7 6 Where
parties have not expressed a choice on the applicable law, ICSID
tribunals have taken different positions on the applicability of domestic
law, sometimes applying domestic law and at other times, international

74. This is a North-South paradigmatic conflict on the applicable law, which is
beginning to lose its fervor mostly because of the South's need for investment capital.
SORNARAJAH, SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES, supra note 7, at 28.
75. Aron Broches, The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
between States and Nationalsof Other States, 136 RECUEIL DES CouRs 331, 392 (1972).
In Ibrahim Shihata & Antonio Parra, Applicable Substantive Law in Disputes between
States and Private Foreign Parties: The Case of Arbitrationunder the ICSID Convention, 9
ICSID REv.-FILJ 183, 192 (1994) [hereinafter Shihata & Parra, Substantive Law], the
authors also adopt a similar view, arguing that under the second sentence in article 42(1)
of the ICSID Convention, a tribunal could set aside applicable national law where it is
inconsistent with international law.
76. Prosper Weil, The State, the Foreign Investor and InternationalLaw: The No
Longer Stormy Relationship of a Menage A Trois, 15 ICSID REv.-FILJ 401, 409 (2000).
Contra W. Michael Reisman, The Regime for Lacunae in the ICSID Choice of Law
Provision and the Question of its Threshold, 15 ICSID REv.-FILJ 362, 363 (2000)
(arguing that from the drafting history of article 42(1) of the ICSID Convention, it was
intended that domestic law should be the default applicable law). Professor Reisman
argues that the drafting history does not express "an intent for a disguised superordination of
international law in all cases." Id.
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law.77 In fact, Third World states themselves have sought to rely on
domestic law or international law depending on which one furthers their
However, in practice, international law has been the most
case.
frequently applied law to disputes submitted to ICSID. For example, in
SPP v. Egypt, the defendant argued that the law of Egypt was applicable
given the fact that the tribunal found jurisdiction based on a domestic
Egyptian legislation, but the tribunal found in favor of the claimant on
that point, holding that international law was the law applicable to the
dispute, as Egyptian law did not cover every point in the dispute. 78 For
most Third World countries, their agreements, if they include the host
state's domestic law as the applicable law, are usually accompanied by a
reference to international law, 79 or some adopt international law as the
dominant applicable law, with domestic law playing a supplementary
role.8 0 Alternatively, like in the NAFTA, the81 investment agreement
in question is designated as the applicable law.
In several instances, Third World states have sought to apply
international law to the dispute before ICSID tribunals. In Santa Elena
v. Costa Rica, the claimant and defendant found themselves in ironic
situations where the former argued for the applicability of Costa Rican
law and the latter argued that international law was applicable. 82 The
tribunal found that Costa Rican law was consistent with international
law and that both parties' divergent positions lead to the same conclusion.
It applied international law to the dispute and awarded $16 million in
compensation to the claimant.
Positions such as that adopted by Costa Rica in the Santa Elena case
might suggest that Third World states have embraced the internationalization
In LETCO v. Liberia, 26 I.L.M. 647 (1987), 2 ICSID REP. 343, 357-58 (1994).
77.
the tribunal found domestic law sufficient as the applicable law.
78. For a commentary on the proceeding, which was subsequently discontinued at
the annulment phase, see Georges Delaume, The Pyramids Stand-The Pharaohs Can
Rest in Peace, 8 ICSID REV.-FILJ 231 (1993).
79. See Kaiser Bauxite Company v. Government of Jamaica, ICSID REP. 296
(1993). Commentators have observed that ICSID tribunals apply domestic law where it
is found to be in conformity with international law. See Shihata & Parra, Substantive
Law, supra note 75, at 205-206.
80. Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. v. Republic of Sri Lanka, 30 I.L.M. 577
(1991), ICSID REV.-FILJ 526 (1991).
See Maritime Int'l Nominees Establishment v. Government of the Republic of
81.

Guinea, ICSID REV.-FILJ 95, 111 (1990).
82. Compania del Desarrollo de Santa Elena S.A. v. Republic of Costa Rica,
ICSID Case No. ARB/96/I, 15 ICSID REV.-FILJ 169 (2000), paras. 61, 62, 64, 65. See
also Kl6ckner v. Cameroon, supra note 72.

of foreign investment disputes. However, this is not necessarily so. The
more accurate position is that these states (like foreign investors) adopt
the legal position that best suits their interests at that point it time, and in
the Santa Elena case, Costa Rica believed that the international law
position was more favorable to its interests. But generally, international
law is the law most frequently applied to disputes settled by ICSID tribunals.
C. Depoliticization
One of the major contributions of ICSID to the settlement of investment
disputes is its ability to exclude the home states of foreign investors from
formally participating in the dispute once a claim has been submitted to
ICSID. 83 The ICSID Convention deems the exclusion of diplomatic
protection of foreign investors necessary to balancing the interests of
Third World states, and powerful capital exporting states and their
nationals who invest abroad.8 4 Also, commentators regard ICSID's
Administrative Council-the institution's governing body-with its one
representative per country quota and each having an equal vote, as a
reflection of equal representation for all contracting states and a balance
of interests.8 5
In practice, ICSID's depoliticization agenda-to the point that it entails
avoiding the formal espousal of foreign investors' claims by their home
states-has been successful, as there have been no cases necessitating
diplomatic protection in the context of ICSID. However, given the
nature of international investment law generally, investment dispute
settlement always remains politicized to an extent, at least, at the
international level. States have a stake in the interpretations of clauses
and the jurisprudence of arbitral tribunals. A case on point is the
interpretations adopted by the NAFTA Free Trade Commission-which
comprises the three state parties to NAFTA-in 2001.86 Of course, it

83. This position is aptly stated in article 27(1) of the ICSID Convention as
follows: "No Contracting State shall give diplomatic protection, or bring an international
claim, in respect of a dispute which one of its nationals and another Contracting State
shall have consented to submit or shall have submitted to arbitration under this
Convention, unless such other Contracting State shall have failed to abide by and comply

with the award rendered in such dispute."
84. See generally SHIHATA, DEPOLITICIZATION OF INvESTMENT DIsPUTES, supra
note 45; Andrew Jacovides, International Tribunals: Do they Really Work for Small
States?, 34 NYU J. INT'L L. & POL. 253 (2001).
85.
SHIHATA, DEPOLITICIZATION OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES, supra note 45, at 5.
See articles 4(1) & 7(2) of the ICSID Convention for the provisions on the administrative

council.
86. NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Notes on Interpretationof Certain Chapter
11 Provisions (31 July 2001), http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/NAFTA-Interpren.asp. For many, investor-state arbitration initiated against Canada and the Untied

[VOL. 8: 345, 2007]

ICSID
SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J.

might not be ICSID's place to address the politicization of investment
disputes on a general international level, especially between majority of
Third World states on the one hand, and foreign investors and developed
home states on the other hand; but one should not ignore the realities of
international investment dispute settlement-that it is an arena for power
struggles aimed at espousing particular view points as representing the
position of international law on foreign investments. As such, the better
claim for ICSID's proponents to make might be the specific assertion
that ICSID excludes formal diplomatic protection once a case is before
the institution and not the broader and more encompassing claim that
ICSID depoliticizes investment disputes.
D. Third World States and Reactions to ICSID: Some Examples
Generally, the relationship between Third World states and ICSID has
seemed cordial. However, despite this appearance of cordiality and even
though most of ICSID members are Third World states, there have been
some negative reactions to the institution. Third World states are not
alone in this regard as even developed states in the context of NAFTACanada and the United States (along with Mexico)-have proceeded to
retreat from liberal access to investor-state arbitration and have sought
ways to restore their regulatory sovereignty. 87 This section considers three
examples of adverse reactions to ICSID. First, most Latin American
states did not ratify the ICSID Convention at the institution's inception
due to their adoption of the Calvo doctrine. 88 However, over the years
these states have gradually embraced the ICSID Convention.8 9 This
States under NAFTA came as a surprise as developed states are not used to being defendants
in institutional international investment arbitration.
87. Charles H. Brower 11,Investor-State Disputes Under NAFTA: The Empire
Strikes Back, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 43 (2001); Marcia J. Staff & Christine W.
Lewis, Arbitration Under NAFTA Chapter 11: Past, Present and Future, 25 Hous. J.
INT'LL. 301 (2003).
88. For an introduction to the Calvo doctrine and its effects in relation to ICSID,
see SHIHATA, DEPOLITICiZATION OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES, supra note 45. It is important
to note that even though critical of Latin American states' adoption of the Calvo clause,

developed states have also adopted similar principles by excluding oil and gas disputes
from international arbitration until recently when the negotiation and entry into force of
the Energy Charter Treaty necessitated submitting oil and gas disputes to international
arbitration, even for developed state parties to the Treaty. See Walde, From Dispute
Settlement to Treaty Implementation, supra note 13, at 437-38.

89. A group of Third World states including states mostly from Latin AmericaArgentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru,

phenomenon has been explained as being due to the perceived benefits
of ratifying the ICSID Convention. For example, Professor Baker states
that since Peru ratified the ICSID Convention, it has become more
appealing to foreign investors. 90 Moreover, ICSID might be relevant even
to states that do not ratify the ICSID Convention, as an ICSID tribunal
may assume jurisdiction in a dispute that involves such a state through
the Additional Facility Rules. Mexico provides a case on point. Even
though it has not ratified the ICSID Convention, by being a state party to
NAFTA, Mexico has been a defendant in seven concluded and six
pending cases under ICSID's Additional Facility Rules.
Second, in spite of the fact that Jamaica was one of the states that
ratified the ICSID Convention at the institution's inception, it unilaterally
withdrew from three simultaneous ICSID proceedings citing technicalities
and rejected ICSID's jurisdiction. 9' The disputes arose because contrary
to an agreement that stabilized local taxes in relation to aluminum producers
for 25 years-the entire period of the bauxite mining concession in
question-the Jamaican government levied a tax on bauxite mining.
The ICSID tribunal made a ruling on jurisdiction but the cases were
discontinued before the tribunal could render a decision on the merits of
the cases. Baker states that "most economic analysts at that time forecast
that the Jamaican Government's actions in this area would be costly to
that country's development. The international stigma attached to the
withdrawal by a government from an internationally sanctioned procedure
after accepting that procedure certainly has long term ramifications for
Jamaica. ' 92 It would have been instructive if the tribunals had expressed
their opinion on the stabilization clauses and the apparent tensions they
generate, had Jamaica defended the cases instead of settling.
Third, and more recent, is the case of the more than thirty ICSID cases
pending against Argentina. Despite its adoption of neoliberal economic
policies, Argentina experienced severe economic crisis in 2001. In
the Philippines, Uruguay and Venezuela-expressed their disapproval with the proposed
ICSID Convention at the time it was being drafted. See International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development Resolution on Settlement of Investment Disputes, adopted Sept. 10,
1964, 3 I.L.M. 1171, 1174-75 (1964). In more recent years, all these states except Brazil
and Mexico have ratified the Convention. The Dominican Republic and Haiti have only
signed but not ratified the Convention.
90. BAKER, supra note 60, at 179.
91. Alcoa Minerals of Jam., Inc. (U.S.) v. Jamaica, 4 Y.B. COM. ARB. 206 (1979);
Kaiser Bauxite Company v. Jamaica, 114 I.L.R. 144 (1999); ICSID REP. 296 (1993);
Reynolds Jam. Mines Ltd. v. Jamaica, ICSID Case No. ARB/74/4 (1975). All three cases
were discontinued and settled.
92. Baker, supra note 60, at 75. While the impacts of Jamaica's actions may not
have been measured at the time or even fully measurable, it is possible that there were
initial panic reactions by foreign investors. However, it is uncertain that Jamaica lost
investment flows that could have accrued to it.
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response to the crisis, it adopted policy choices that resulted in what has
been referred to as the "daunting task" of defending more than thirty
ICSID cases. Commentators have estimated that Argentina is likely to
93
lose most of these cases and faces millions of dollars in compensation.
In reaction to this, the Argentinean government has adopted the extreme
legal position that its BITs obligations are unconstitutional and therefore
unenforceable under domestic law. Thus, there is a case of growing opposition
94
not only to investment treaties but also to ICSID in Argentina.
These examples, especially the last one, reflect the legitimacy crisis
that ICSID faces. This is mostly attributable to the Convention's assumption
of a single economic rationale for investment protection and the tribunals'
insufficient attention to interests that do not necessarily conform to the
neoliberal paradigm. Most Third World states' needs are not reflected in
tribunal decisions, which explain their ambivalence towards ICSID. The
argument is not that ICSID tribunals should decide cases where states
clearly breach their obligations in favor of those states. Rather, it is that
ICSID tribunals should recognize, like the initial Klockner tribunal did,
but within the parameters of the applicable law, that there may be
explanations for a state's actions, and factor this into their decisions,
even if they eventually reach a finding against the state.
IV.

TOWARD THE ACCOMMODATION OF MULTIPLE
PARADIGMS AND INTERESTS

International law like all law, is changing.95 At the time the ICSID
Convention was drafted, it was the first of its kind-having given
individuals the ability to sue states for breaches of obligations arising
from investments. Today, forty years later, international law has gone further
than the ICSID Convention contemplated. NGOs have proliferated and
93. Jason Webb Yackee, Are BITs Such A Bright Idea? Exploring the Ideational
Basis of Investment Treaty Enthusiasm, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 195, 222

(2005).
94. See Carlos E. Alfaro & Pedro M. Lorenti, The Growing Opposition of
Argentina to ICSID Arbitral Tribunals.-A Conflict between Internationaland Domestic
Law?, 6 J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 417 (2005); Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy
Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration. Privatizing Public International Law through
Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521 (2005).
95.

MARGARET DAVIES, DELIMITING THE LAW:

'POSTMODERNISM'

AND THE

POLITICS OF LAW 114 (1996) states that the law is "a becoming rather than a being." On
the changes to international law in the context of international dispute settlement see
ORREGO VICUNA, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN AN EVOLVING GLOBAL SOCIETY:
CONSTITUTIONALIZATION, ACCESSIBILITY, PRIVATIZATION (2004).

have become a force to be reckoned with in the international order.
Human rights and international environmental law have become major
areas of international law and the rights of natural persons have garnered
considerable attention that cannot be ignored. The economic development
of the Third World has also assumed a magnitude beyond what it was
when ICSID was established.
In recognition of the changing nature of international investment law,
Professor Sornarajah notes three conflicting paradigms that have arisen
in relation to foreign investment. 96 Previously, there were mainly two
conflicting views-that of the Third World on the one hand, and TNCs
as well as developed states on the other hand. However, presently, NGOs
have carved a niche for themselves in espousing labor, environmental,
and human rights claims. The free market paradigm, favored by many
developed states, relies on several principles including, the free movement
of foreign investment (a principle emphasized in ICSID's preamble);
sanctity of the foreign investment contract; the international minimum
standard; "full compensation" in the event of expropriation; international
arbitration of foreign investment disputes; and the creation of international
treaty regimes on investment protection. The prevalent Third World
approach is supported by principles like the absence of freedom of
entry for investment, the possibility of restructuring contracts based on
arguments of sovereignty, national standard of treatment, localization of
the foreign investment contract, and maintaining a difference between state
contracts and ordinary contracts. Mostly, because of their development
concerns and the need to attract foreign investment, Third World states
usually contract outside the framework of these principles, for example,
delocalizing foreign investment contracts by submitting to international
dispute settlement. In spite of this, they usually espouse alternative views in
multilateral forums, which do not always correspond with those of
foreign investors and the majority of developed capital exporting states.
The third paradigm, favored by NGOs, adopts a people-centered approach
that transcends positivist conceptions of international law. Its focus is on
the environment and human rights, and sometimes, economic development.
Claims by NGOs are not always in tandem with the positions espoused by
either developed or Third World states.
Although the foregoing classification represents the dominant views
that these groups subscribe to, some caveats are necessary. First, as
stated earlier, Third World states often contract outside the principles
they subscribe to for several reasons, such as the need to attract foreign
investment, which is almost always achieved on particular terms based
on the developed countries' free market paradigm. However, this does
96.

SORNARAJAH, SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES, supra note 7, at 77-84.
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not necessarily imply that Third World states have changed their ideas
on the international law on foreign investment. Second, developed states
also adopt different arguments depending on whether they are in the
position of capital exporters or capital importers. As capital exporters, they
generally subscribe to the free market paradigm but as capital importers
they make arguments similar to those adopted by Third World states.
The position of NGOs is not entirely clear, and it will not be out of place
to question whether there is an NGO paradigm in international investment
law which is separate from the political economy of developed and
Third World states. Irrespective of the conclusions on this point, there is
clearly a paradigm that takes environmental and human rights issues into
account. This is sometimes deployed as a strategic defense argument by
developed as well as Third World states. Largely, the three groups can
be identified based on the categorization above, with cautionary considerations
of the intersections that sometimes occur.
Even though there have been general changes in international law and
the different view points described above exist, ICSID is generally premised
on a positivist conception of international law, a view that cannot
accommodate the changes to international law without some deliberate
re-conception. In order to maintain its relevance in an "evolving global
society", ICSID needs to accommodate divergent interests and multiple
views expressed by different stakeholders in international investment. If
this cannot be achieved, the institution cannot validly claim to be located
in a space where it can continue to be reckoned with as the premier
international investment dispute settlement institution. Since ICSID already
adequately provides for investment protection, I will not address investment
protection in my suggestions in this part. Rather, the focus will be on
those interests that have not been adequately represented and which
threaten the continued relevance of the system.
A. Previous Recommendations to Enhance ICSID's Effectiveness
Apart from considerations of incorporating an appeal mechanism into
ICSID, which the institution decided not to adopt in the most recent
amendments of its rules in April 2006, most of the suggestions for
enhancing ICSID's effectiveness have focused on procedure.9 7 However, a
97.
See ICSID Secretariat, Possible Improvements of the Framework for ICSID
Arbitration, ICSID Secretariat Discussion Paper (Oct. 22, 2004), http://www. worldbank.
org/icsid/highlights/improve-arb.pdf See also Howard Mann, et al., Comments on ICSID

few commentators have taken on the issue of addressing substantive
effectiveness. In the concluding chapter of his book on ICSID, Moshe
98
Hirsch makes some recommendations for enhancing ICSID's effectiveness.
His suggestions largely turn on possibilities for broadening ICSID's
substantive and personal jurisdiction. He argues that any changes to ICSID's
substantive jurisdiction to allow it to settle non-investment disputes will
substantively change ICSID's character contrary to the aim of its founders.
On broadening personal jurisdiction to allow ICSID to settle disputes
that arise between parties other than states and foreign investors, he
argues that this will not detract from ICSID's character as an investment
dispute settlement mechanism. However, he does not recommend that
the Centre should settle disputes between states as this would amount to
politicization. Nevertheless, he suggests that a state should be allowed to
initiate proceedings against another state where the claimant state has
substantially participated alongside the private investor in the investment
project in the host state. He bases this suggestion on the rationale that
"the present jurisdictional limitation of the Centre to settle only bilateral
transactions, on one side of which is the private investor, with the host
state on the other side, is likely to frustrate the comprehensive and final
99
settlement of the investment dispute among all the parties to the dispute."
I do not subscribe to such jurisdictional expansion for two reasons. First,
such expansion of jurisdiction will amount to politicization of investment
disputes, which ICSID seeks to avoid, and will detract from the purposes
of the Convention. The Convention expressly states that there should be
no interference from the home state of the foreign investor where a
dispute is before the Centre and the argument on comprehensive and
final settlement of a dispute is not strong enough to make ICSID detract
from one of its primary aims. Also, even where a home state and a
foreign investor carry out an investment in the host state together, a
settlement of the dispute in relation to the foreign investor should be
sufficient disposal of any claims by the home state, since they would be
acting in concert. Second, Hirsch's argument seems biased in favor of a
position where the claimant is always a foreign investor and the
defendant, a state. He does not envision a situation where an investor
and his home state are in breach of an investment agreement. In that

Discussion Paper, "Possible Improvements of the Framework for ICSID Arbitration"
(Dec. 2004), http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2004/investment-icsid-response.pdf, Luke Eric
Peterson, All Roads Lead out of Rome: Divergent Paths of Dispute Settlement in Bilateral
Investment Treaties, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT:

BALANCING RIGHTS AND REWARDS 123 (Lyuba Zarsky ed., 2005).
98. HIRSCH, supra note 5, at 155-64.
99. Id. at 157-58.
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case, can the host state bring a claim against both parties before ICSID
too? He does not raise this question; nor does he proffer an answer to it.
Hirsch also suggests that personal jurisdiction may be broadened by
allowing the Centre to deal with disputes arising between foreign private
investors and private individuals or companies in the host state. Given
the present case load of ICSID and its focus on disputes involving a state
party or entity, private parties that enter into agreements should be able
to settle their disputes through ad hoc international commercial arbitration,
without implicating an international treaty-based mechanism like ICSID
that retains its validity as such, through the involvement of states in the
dispute settlement proceedings. It is understandable that such suggestions
would have been made in 1993 when ICSID's caseload was not as heavy.
Presently, with its caseload, the Centre does not need to expand its jurisdiction,
rather, it needs to be effective in discharging its duties in relation to its
current jurisdiction.
In considering the arbitrability of disputes, Professor Sornarajah has
suggested that some categories of investment disputes should be settled
by domestic courts or the International Court of Justice (ICJ).' 0 0 He
argues that the ICJ may be a more appropriate forum where international
public interest is involved; and domestic courts may constitute better
forums, where national interest is at stake. Even though the argument is
meritorious, it is limited for two reasons. First, states are unwilling to
submit investment disputes to the ICJ,10' and even more so, the ICJ's
jurisdiction is limited to inter-state dispute settlement. Second, and a
point which Professor Sornarajah readily concedes, investors are skeptical
about the domestic legal systems of host states. Further, considerations
of sovereign immunity and private international law rules on forum non
conveniens make the submissions of disputes to home states of foreign
investors difficult. 0 2 Thus, until a time when states will be willing to
100. SORNARAJAH, SETTLEMENT OF INvEsTMENT DISPUTES, supranote 7, at 174-76.
101.
For example, one of the few investment cases that have been submitted to the
ICJ, the ELSI case, was submitted to a chamber of the ICJ and not the full court.
Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (U.S. v. Italy) 1989 I.C.J. REP. (Sec. 108) 65 (July 20, 1989).
102. This does not mean that some jurisdictions, especially the United States, have
not assumed jurisdiction on claims brought by private individuals against United States'
TNCs. However, this has not always been on the basis of domestic legislation providing
for such jurisdiction foundations. For example, the United States' court assumed
jurisdiction in Doe v. Unocal, 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002) based not on the Alien Torts
Claims Act, but on the basis that there is a universal jurisdiction over violations ofjus
cogens principles of international law, irrespective of nationality. It is noteworthy that
even though United States' courts have assumed jurisdiction in these cases, there has not

submit inter-state investment claims to the ICJ and when sufficient rules
on private international law allowing access to home states courts are
fully developed, one needs to consider the possibility of addressing public
interest claims within ICSID. Next, I consider some suggestions for enhancing
ICSID's effectiveness in this regard.
B. Recommendationsfor BalancedDispute Settlement
1. Adopting a More Robust Analysis of Investment Disputes
First, it is important to distinguish between ICSID and ad hoc
international arbitration. ICSID is a creation of treaty; thus, it potentially
has a level of international legitimacy not shared by regular ad hoc
arbitration. In addition, ICSID settles investment disputes involving at least
one state party or entity, and it does not engage in ordinary commercial
arbitration between private parties. As a result of the position that it occupies
in the international economic order, it should be able to envision that
public interest cases would arise since state parties are involved and they
more often than not have other interests apart from purely commercial
interests at stake.
Because it is an international institution specializing in settling
investment disputes, ICSID should situate itself in a space where it can
take matters of international concern and public interest into accountincluding the concerns of Third World peoples, economic development,
environmental protection and human rights. These issues are not necessarily
extra-legal since they all have international rules applicable to them and
the bulk of the law applicable in ICSID proceedings is international law. So
far, environmental issues have been the most prevalent public interest
matters that ICSID tribunals have addressed.10 3 One could derive a basis
for the public interest argument from the ICSID Report's position on°4
promoting "mutual confidence" between states and foreign investors.'

been any finding of liability so far. On the problems with forum non conveniens, see
BAXI, supra note 57; Upendra Baxi, Mass Torts, MultinationalEnterpriseLiability and
PrivateInternationalLaw, 276 RECUEIL DES COURS 297 (1999).

103.

See Compania del Desarrollo de Santa Elena S.A. v. Republic of Costa Rica,

ICSID Case No. ARB/96/1, 15 ICSID REv.-FILJ 169 (2000); Metalclad Corporation v.
United Mexican States, 40 I.L.M. 36 (2001); Trcnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A.
v. United Mexican States, 43 1.L.M. 133 (2004).
104. Some ICSID tribunals have alluded to the responsibility of foreign investors in
addition to their rights in some decisions, although not to the substantial degree that this
article seeks. See MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. and MTD Chile S.A. v. Republic of Chile (May 25,
2004), http://www.asil.org/ilib/MTDvChile.pdf; International Institute for Sustainable
Development, Investment Treaty News (2006), http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2006/itndec
19 2006.pdf; World Duty Free Co., Ltd. v. Republic of Kenya (Oct. 4, 2006), http://
www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/WDF-KenyaAward.pdf.
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However, it is possible to argue that the "mutual confidence" clause is
included in the Report and not the Convention. Such contention could be
resolved by the application of the rules of interpretation in articles 31
and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which recognizes
supplementary means of interpretation.10 5 Moreover, the ICSID Report is
attached to the ICSID Convention and has been adopted as the document
that describes the provisions of and explains the need for the Convention.
Apart from the ICSID Report, the preamble to the ICSID Convention
alludes to the need to encourage "international cooperation for economic
development" and if the Centre is to continue to have any relevance in
the multifaceted 21 st century investment environment, the tribunals need to
take matters of development into account. The OECD's proposed
Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) negotiations provides a case
on point. Because of the MAI's inability to address divergent interests even
among developed states, and through the clamor of NGOs, the negotiations
were eventually derailed.' 06
The suggestion here is not that ICSID should address purely human
rights, economic development or environmental issues, as doing so
would be outside its jurisdiction if they do not arise from an investment.
Rather, ICSID tribunals should not refrain from considering these issues
where they constitute legal disputes arising directly out of an investment
as contemplated by article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention. Investment
disputes between states and foreign investors by their very nature implicate
interests beyond the commercial, and it does a disservice to those affected to
keep mute about these public interest matters. However, if some argue
that considering non-commercial interests in addition to commercial
interests amounts to overstretching article 25(1), recourse could be had
under ICSID's Additional Facility Rules, which allow the settlement of
disputes that do not arise directly out of an investment. The limitation of
this is that by article 3 of the Additional Facility Rules, the ICSID
Convention, and its potential benefits do not apply to such proceedings.

105. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331,
8 I.L.M. 679. The analysis of articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention in MARTIN
DIXON, TEXTBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 65-70 (5th ed. 2005) are instructive in this
respect.
106. Riyaz Dattu, A Journey from Havana to Paris: The Fifty-Year Quest for the
Elusive Multilateral Agreement on Investment, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 275 (2000);
Kelley, supra note 64.

2. DisinterestedDevelopment of the InternationalLaw on
ForeignInvestment
The international law on foreign investment is still largely a contested
site and one amenable to construction by dominant voices, including
ICSID. ICSID's privileged position in this regard is enhanced by its gradual
assumption of the status of a regime in foreign investment dispute
settlement, 0 7 as a significant number of investment treaties, domestic
legislation, and investment contracts refer disputes to the institution and
08
it has the opportunity of interpreting the provisions of these documents.
In fact, Regulation 22(2) of ICSID's Administrative and Financial
Regulations envisages the institution's contribution to the development
of the international law on investments. Even though arbitral awards
constitute a subsidiary source of international law,' 0 9 and even though it
is usually argued that arbitral tribunals are not subject to the doctrine of
precedent, ICSID is in a good position to facilitate the development of
clear rules on international investment law. Commentators usually note the
difficulty of adopting consistent decisions in investment treaty arbitration." 0
While this is a legitimate concern when considering a host of dispute
settlement options available in the investment regime, in the case of ICSID,
which is a single institution, although there are no standing tribunals,
and even without adopting a precedent based approach, there is room for
the development of rules that eventually metamorphose into foreign
investment laws. However, a lopsided support for any economic theory
or any side of the debate that plagues this area of the law will not bode
well for the development of the international law on foreign investment.
Like Article 1 of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States
provides, "every State has the sovereign and inalienable right to choose
its economic system as well as its political, social and cultural systems in
accordance with the will of its people, without outside interference,
coercion or threat in any form whatsoever." It recognizes the rights of
states to determine their own destiny, although states' international
obligations acquired under international investment treaties, suggest that
exercising this right would require the delicate balancing of several
competing interests.

107. On a developing investment regime, see SORNARAJAH, SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT
DispuTEs, supra note 7, at 163-172; Alvarez, supra note 8.
108. See infra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
109. Statute of the International Court of Justice, Jun. 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060,
T.S. No. 993, art. 38.
110. See generally Susan Franck, supra note 94; Alvarez, supra note 8.
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The international law on foreign investment should not write off the
applicability of domestic law thereby precluding states from expressing
conceptions of development developed locally, especially where this
conflicts with economic (neo)liberalism, and should not preclude states
from maintaining their identities, their peculiarities and their difference,
if any. Take the case of Argentina for example; analysts have predicted
that it would lose most of the cases pending against it before ICSID and
it adopted several counterarguments in response to this barrage of cases.
Definitely, like any other state, or even any defendant generally, Argentina
would have put up a defense, but it is unlikely that it would have resorted to
its desperate arguments if it believed that its interests will be adequately
accounted for. These arguments generally reveal that there is an intersection
between domestic economic policies and ICSID cases that one cannot
afford to ignore. ICSID disputes usually extend beyond mere disagreements
between foreign investors and states, as they very often implicate the
interests of millions of people that are affected by economic and other
policies that form the subject of contention before ICSID tribunals.
Argentina's argument in the jurisdictional phase of the Suez, Sociedad
General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. v.
Argentine Republic case is instructive in this respect.'" Argentina
argued inter alia that the dispute was about the wisdom of general
economic measures taken by the Argentinian government to deal with
the economic and financial crisis it was facing and were general
measures not directed specifically at the claimants. The claimants taking a
contrary position, contended that Argentina's measures "specifically,
concretely, and directly" violated commitments that it made to them as
foreign investors in the privatized water industry. In particular, the
claimants argued that Argentina failed to "reestablish the concession's
financial equilibrium and to adjust tariffs." In paragraph 29 of its decision,
the tribunal held that "the disagreement arises directly out of the investment
impacted by governmental measures, not out of the measures themselves."
It asserted that it was not concerned with "the wisdom, legality or
soundness of the policy measures taken by Argentina to deal with the

11.
Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. v. The Argentine Republic,
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19 (Aug. 3, 2006), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/SuezVivendi
AWGjurisdiction.pdf (Decision on Jurisdiction); Aguas Argentinas, S.A., Suez, Sociedad
General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/
03/19 (May 19, 2005), http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/ARB0319-AC-en.pdf (Order
in Response to a Petition for Transparency and Participation as Amicus Curiae).

economic crisis." In spite of this argument, one cannot overlook the
reality that Argentina's ICSID cases arose out of measures the state took
in reaction to its financial crisis.
Generally, states are more likely to take responsibility for the effects
of the policies they adopt if they make such decisions based on the needs
of the state and its peoples and not based on the imposition of foreign
models or standards; for in reality, one size does not necessarily fit all
states. This expression of domestic economic policies that may facilitate
economic development is an important factor that ICSID tribunals
cannot afford to rule out without backlash from the Third World. ICSID
tribunals can be more proactive and are well situated to facilitate the
development of a robust international law on investment. Such law is
one that should consider all the necessary facets and effects of investment,
including economic development, and environmental and human rights
considerations. This is necessary to maintain ICSID's effectiveness and
continued relevance at a time where such issues are of international
concern.
3. Constitutionof Panels
In order to accommodate diverse interests, some might argue that
ICSID arbitrators are not competent to address human rights and
environmental questions that arise directly out of an investment. This
argument might derive from the qualification of ICSID arbitrators and
the fact that the system like other arbitral systems is a consensual one
where the parties select the arbitrators. 1 2 However, it is important to
assume that arbitrators are independent and impartial and will discharge
their duties to the best of their ability. The question of qualification is
different though. According to article 13 of the ICSID Convention,
arbitrators and conciliators are to be "persons of high moral character"
having "recognized competence in the fields of law, commerce, industry
or finance who may be relied upon to exercise independent judgment."
Clearly, this provision envisions mostly commercial disputes. However,
other legal disputes may arise directly out of an investment and in order
to enhance ICSID's effectiveness in addressing legal (public interest) disputes

112. See HOWARD MANN & KONRAD VON MOLTKE, A SOUTHERN AGENDA ON
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT?: PROMOTING DEVELOPMENT WITH BALANCED RIGHTS AND
OBLIGATIONS FOR INVESTORS, HOST STATES AND HOME STATES 17 (2005), http://www.
iisd.org/publications/pub.aspx?id=687 (suggesting that arbitrators in investment dispute
settlement should be selected in a neutral manner and not by the parties to the dispute).
The issue in this section of this article is not about who selects the arbitrators rather, the
focus is on the qualifications of arbitrators that are selected, irrespective of the identities
of those that do the selection.
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that arise out of investments, there is a need for deliberate constitution of
panels to reflect this.
I do not see any immediate need for amending the Convention on this
point (more so, the procedure for amending the Convention is rigorous)
or to include an additional mechanism as was done in 1978, when the
Additional Facility Rules were included. Environmental and human rights
lawyers, for example, are covered by article 13, as competence is not
restricted to any particular area of law. This is important, for breaches
of environmental and human rights laws in the course of carrying out
investment amounts to legal disputes that arise from an investment. In
the absence of an amendment, the responsibility falls on the parties to
the disputes to select arbitrators with expertise in these areas where
necessary. Any additional responsibility accrues to the Chairman of
ICSID's Administrative Council, who is the President of the World
Bank,' 13 to select arbitrators learned in these matters in those instances
where the Chairman assumes responsibility for selecting arbitrators on
behalf of the parties where they do not appoint the arbitrator(s). I14
4. DraftingEqual Model Clauses
Although the ICSID Convention does not address this point explicitly,
paragraph 13 of the ICSID Report states that "the Convention permits
the institution of proceedings by host States as well as by investors and
the Executive Directors have constantly had in mind that the provisions
of the Convention should be equally adapted to the requirements of both
cases." This provision remains relevant in spite of paragraph 24 of the ICSID
Report that allows unilateral offers by states in domestic investment promotion
legislation and acceptances by foreign investors of such offers of consent
to ICSID jurisdiction. To date, majority of ICSID cases have been instituted
by foreign investors against Third World states. The enabling agreements
that provide such consent usually incorporate unilateral dispute settlement
clauses that give rise to arbitration without privity in favor of the foreign
investor, while the host state does not have a similar right. This totally
defeats host states' ability to bring claims and sometimes, even counterclaims.

113. ICSID Convention, supra note 5, art. 5.
114. Id. art. 38. By article 52(3) of the ICSID Convention, the Chairman of the
Administrative Council is also responsible for appointing all members of ad hoc annulment
committees.

Despite arbitration without privity clauses that now seem to prevail,
by paragraph 13 of the ICSID Report, ICSID contemplates a dual dispute
settlement mechanism, and as part of its secondary role in drafting
model clauses, it could encourage the drafting of reciprocal investment
dispute settlement clauses. This is important because in the absence of
this, states will be precluded from initiating claims before ICSID and its
purpose of enhancing "mutual confidence" will be partly defeated. Also,
in order to avoid being considered as a system that places lopsided
emphasis on the interests of foreign investors, in their information
dissemination role, ICSID representatives should discourage or at least
not encourage the drafting of clauses that lead to arbitration without
privity.
V. CONCLUSION

ICSID is capable of effecting changes. It established Additional Facility
Rules in 1978. Also, procedurally, ICSID has commenced the development
of a system that relies on transparent investment dispute settlement in
recognition of the multiple rights that are implicated. For example, subject
to exceptions, the recently amended ICSID Arbitration Rules, which
came into force on April 10, 2006, allow ICSID tribunals to accept written
amicus curiae briefs.1'5 This came in response to the clamor for transparency
16
in such cases as Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. The Republic of Bolivia'
and Aguas Agrentinas v. Argentine Republic." 17 However, the suggestions
in this article are more fundamental and may require some time to
substantiate. They relate to ICSID's continued relevance to the Third World
and would necessarily involve challenges to dominant voices on the
international law on foreign investment and investment dispute settlement.
In my view, if the system ceases to be relevant, designing effective rules
of procedure, as important as they are, becomes pointless.
The discussions in this article have focused on states and foreign
investors as contemplated by ICSID. ICSID jurisdiction does not extend
to cases where individuals may need to espouse claims against foreign
investors without the intervention of states. A number of such claims,
especially human rights claims arising from investments, have been8
submitted to United States' Courts under the Alien Torts Claim Act."
115. ICSID, Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings, Rule 37 (Apr. 15, 2006),
availableat http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/basicdoc/basicdoc.htm.
116. Aguas del Tunari, S.A., v. Republic of Bolivia, 20 ICSID REV. 450 (2005).
117. See supra note 111.
118. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) or 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (West 2006). Doe v. Unocal
Corp., 248 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2001) provides an example on this point. For a recent
analysis of Doe v. Unocal and similar cases, see Andrew J. Wilson, Beyond Unocal:
ConceptualProblems in Using InternationalNorms to Hold TransnationalCorporations
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While one could explain ICSID's lack of focus on cases where individuals
seek to enforce international obligations against foreign investors as
being outside the institution's jurisdiction, the lack of adequate attention
to non-commercial interests in those cases within its jurisdiction is nonexcusable. This position reveals the failure of ICSID, and international
law to develop fast enough to meet the challenges of globalization. Or
rather, this reveals the unwillingness of ICSID and international law to
shed positivist underpinnings and actively adopt a robust approach to
investment dispute settlement. Accommodating multiple interests is not
a task beyond the reach of ICSID; rather the question remains whether
the tribunals will be willing to adopt such a course.

Liable under the Alien Tort Claims Act, in TRANSNATIONAL
RIGHTS 43 (Olivier De Schutter ed., 2006).
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